Brief Thoughts on Algeria's Elections

Incumbent President Abdelmadjid Tebboune won overwhelmingly, but analysts say Algeria's structural challenges aren't going anywhere.

Algeria held presidential elections on September 7. Incumbent President Abdelmadjid Tebboune was swiftly pronounced the winner, with official results giving Tebboune 95% of the vote. His two opponents, Islamist candidate Abdelaali Hassani Cherif and socialist candidate Youcef Aouchiche, scored 3% and 2% respectively. There has been some debate about the turnout, with some estimates putting it as low as 23%-25%. Turnout had been closely watched, with some observers suggesting that turnout would be a better gauge of popular approval for Tebboune than the actual elections results, and/or that turnout would say something about how connected Algerians feel to their political system as a whole. At the BBC, Sally Nabil gives a sort of “man/woman on the street” view of why many people weren’t voting.

Tebboune’s score is the highest that any incumbent Algerian president or regime-favored candidate has won in an election since 1984. His score is in line with those of Chadli Bendjedid from the era of single-party rule under the National Liberation Front (French acronym FLN). Indeed, the analyst Louisa Dris-Aït Hamadouche sees in Tebboune’s first term an echo of pre-liberalization (i.e., pre-1988/1989) models of governance, especially in terms of the military’s role in politics:

Never since the end of the single-party system in 1989, have the military leaders been so politically and publically exposed. The government used to be formally led by civilians while the influence of the military hierarchy remained present but invisible. Surprisingly, the 2019-2024 governance in Algeria hasn’t obeyed to this tacit rule.

I talked about the history of recent Algerian elections here a few weeks ago; my basic outlook is that very high scores are a way for the incumbent authorities to send a message to the population and to the opposition, a message that the space for dissent is quite small. At the same time, I would add that very high scores can sometimes be a sign of nervousness on the part of rulers. In either case, both electoral challengers and street protesters (the country’s Hirak movement, which toppled longtime President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 2019, has been largely repressed) face a largely closed political arena.

A lot of the pre-election analysis on Algeria argued that Tebboune’s second term will see only a superficial stability amid continuing structural challenges.

Here is Amel Boubekeur at the Middle East Institute:

Tebboune's upcoming second term seems to offer an illusion of stability, supported by an authoritarian populism striving to maintain a fragile social contract that cannot be indefinitely renewed on such shaky foundations, especially when it relies on ad hoc measures rather than deep structural reforms. Perceived as an antidote to a potential resurgence of protest movements, it rather reveals how the hasty reconstruction of the state apparatus post-Bouteflika has created a patchwork of sometimes contradictory interests and visions, making it difficult to develop a coherent project for the country's future. More concerning, this focus on short-term stability prevents any serious discussion of the issue of presidential succession — a critical concern given that Tebboune is 79.

And here is Dalia Ghanem at the Middle East Council:

Despite the rise in public support, Tebboune’s policy changes are built on a fragile foundation that will sooner or later be tested by the country’s structural weaknesses. Algeria’s economy remains heavily reliant on hydrocarbons, which account for 93% of product exports and 38% of budget revenues. This means the entire country is vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil and gas markets. Despite the urgent need to accelerate private sector investment in non-hydrocarbon sectors, promises to diversify the economy remain unfulfilled.  

Analysts have also highlighted the trend of repression of dissent, which is expected to continue. Here is Raouf Farrah at ISPI:

Tebboune’s slogan, “New Algeria”, promised political change and a break from the corruption of the Bouteflika era. However, years later, this “New Algeria” has taken on a bitter and dark tone, as authoritarianism has deepened and the Hirak aspirations have faded. A multi-layered repressive apparatus has been put in place. This includes the harassment and prosecution of activists and citizens, the enactment of repressive laws such as the infamous Terrorism Law 87-bis, and the closure of independent civil society organizations, political parties, and media outlets under the pretext of threats to state security.

The post-election political landscape, then, features an astronomical level of official support for President Tebboune, and an ebb for the influence of both the opposition and anti-government protesters, but also a set of formidable challenges for the future.