Dakar to Riyadh: Links for 5/17/2024

News and analysis from the Sahel, North Africa, the Horn, and the Middle East.

General

The Project on Middle East Political Science released a new collection of essays called “Race Politics and Colonial Legacies: France, Africa and the Middle East.”

The new open access book States-in-Waiting: A Counternarrative of Global Decolonization looks fascinating.

James Pogue’s “Wagner in Africa” is well worth a read. One excerpt:

‘The Russians did bring peace here,’ a clothing-shop owner named Sonia Pona told me. She had to flee the country for Cameroon during the fighting in the 2010s. ‘But now it’s peaceful. I can have my business. We were a French colony and now we’re a Russian colony. Maybe next we’ll be an American colony. It’s good to have options.’ She was just one of the many people I spoke with who had mixed feelings about the presence of the Wagner Group in the country.

Sahel and West Africa

Ken Opalo: “The biggest obstacle to clear thinking about stabilizing the Sahel at the moment is the fixation on electoralism as a magical solution.”

I’ve come across several important new journal articles on Mali recently:

• Jaimie Bleck et al., “Drinking Tea with the Neighbors: Informal Clubs, General Trust, and Trustworthiness in Mali,” American Political Science Review

• Joe Gazeley, “The Construction of Terrorist Threat in Mali: Agency and Narratives of Intervention,” International Studies Quarterly

• Sophie Rosenberg, “Terrorists versus Rebels: The Strategic Use of Implicit Amnesty in the Peace Process in Mali,” International Studies Quarterly

Speaking of Mali, the junta’s civilian allies are, unsurprisingly, pushing for an extension of the “transition.”

The Washington Post has published an important interview with Nigerien Prime Minister Lamine Ali Zeine, giving his account of how US-Nigerien diplomatic interactions turned tense.

The Financial Times interviews Central Bank of Nigeria Olayemi Cardoso and discusses his policies.

North Africa

Libya’s Fatwa Commission (whose authority is not universally recognized) has called for a “defensive jihad” against Russian forces in the country. Al Jazeera reports here (Ar) and the original statement is here (Ar). Notably, the Fatwa Commission argues that fighting the Russians “does not mean falling under the control of another occupier.”

Zahra Rahmouni on “Mosque Diplomacy” in Algeria and Morocco:

In Algeria, religious Sufi orders of brotherhoods ( “zawiyah” in dialectal Arabic) have a far-reaching influence, particularly in rural areas of the country. Visitors regularly make donations to them and visit them to practice rituals and honor the memory of the patron saints. Due to their importance to the Algerian population, several of the zawiyahs had been restricted or closed during French colonization. Partly for this reason, political figures believe that the zawiyahs are intrinsically linked to Algeria’s national fabric, and they continue to act as a metaphorical moral compass. Some of them even welcome and train foreign as well as Algerian students of religion—as a result, their reach can transcend borders. One Algerian researcher, who preferred to remain anonymous, explains, “Certain Sufi orders and zawiyahs have branches or affiliations in other countries, particularly in the Maghreb and the Sahel. These networks can be used to propagate spirituality, establish links between communities, facilitate cultural and religious exchanges and sometimes act as centers of informal political power.”

Lilia Blaise on anti-migrant sentiment and policies, and arrests of the president’s critics, in Tunisia (Fr).

Algeria is planning to desalinate a lot of water.

Greater Horn of Africa

The World Food Program:

At least 5 million people in Sudan are on the brink of starvation (IPC4). WFP experts warn that number may have significantly increased since the last Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) assessment in December 2023. A preliminary WFP analysis has identified 41 hunger hotspots that are high-risk of slipping into famine (IPC5) in the coming month, most of them in access constrained areas where conflict is raging including in the Darfur and Kordofan region and Khartoum.   

International Crisis Group: “South Sudan on Edge as Its Neighbour’s War Disrupts Oil Exports.”

Semafor on Kenyan President William Ruto’s state visit to the U.S.

Mashriq

The New York Times: “How Extremists Took Over Israel.”

I learned a lot from Orwa Ajjoub’s “Crossroads in Idlib” about Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), its politically embattled leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, and its internal and external challenges.

Currently, the criteria for securing leadership roles within HTS hinge primarily on proximity to al-Jolani, which in turn depends on members’ social capital, encompassing factors such as tribal affiliations, regional influence, and popularity among fighters. In return for their loyalty, the HTS leadership provides resources, which can be material like jobs, contracts, and money, or non-material like protection and influence. A close look at HTS’s internal structure reveals that clientelism significantly influences its organizational dynamics. This is particularly evident in the three main currents within HTS. Each of these currents, while varying in their degree of influence, plays a distinct role in bolstering the HTS leadership, providing different levels of support and legitimacy.

Reuters analyzes the “political comeback” of Moqtada al-Sadr.

Sultan Alamer on Saudi Arabia as the rulers and the society renegotiate the meanings of 1727, 1744, 1979, and more:

Cultural and religious openness in Saudi Arabia does not translate to political openness. To the contrary, it seems that policymakers think these two kinds of openness are incompatible. This is because political openness will allow perceived conservative and extremist elements in Saudi society to voice their opposition to the government-led project of cultural and religious openness. According to this logic, for cultural and religious openness to succeed, political openness must be suppressed. Indeed, the limited openness of the Saudi public sphere during the 1998-2015 period has all but disappeared, shattered by a series of crackdowns on Sunni and Shiite Islamists, intellectuals, constitutionalists, human rights activists, and feminists. The common denominator of all these groups is that they were politically active and had the capacity to challenge, criticize, or question the government. In addition to these crackdowns, anti-terrorism and cybercrimes laws have been widely used to silence unwanted voices on Saudi social media. It is important to note that the government did not only rely on crude tools to control the Saudi public sphere but has also pushed its own narrative through the development of sophisticated social media strategies in which it enlisted influencers, bots, and trolls.