Mali and the Western Sahara
Morocco now counts the entire Alliance of Sahel States as supporters of its autonomy plan.
On April 10, Mali’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it was ending diplomatic recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and supporting Morocco’s autonomy plan for the disputed Western Sahara territory. Mali now views the autonomy plan, the statement said, “as the only serious and credible basis for the resolution of this dispute.” The statement was issued amid a visit by Morocco’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Nasser Bourita to Mali. For Jeune Afrique’s Nina Kozlowski, the diplomatic triumph for Morocco reflects that Kingdom’s “patient influence” in the Sahel, which “is deeper than it looks.” At the same time, the researcher Hannah Armstrong, quoted by Le Monde, points out that Mali was not a significant backer of the SADR, making this diplomatic reversal symbolically but not logistically significant.
Mali recognized the SADR in 1980, four years after the Republic was proclaimed by the Polisario Front. To briefly cover the historical background, the Western Sahara was colonized by Spain; the Polisario was founded in 1973 to fight for Sahrawi independence. Spanish rule ended in 1975 Spain withdrew in 1975 and signed the Madrid Accords under Moroccan pressure, abandoning plans to hold a referendum [Edited on 4/15 after a reader wrote in to correct me - AJT.] Morocco (fully) and Mauritania (partly) claimed the territory; Mauritania, after its participation in a multi-sided war ended in disaster and a military coup, withdrew in 1979. Morocco maintained its claims and its presence. A 1991 United Nations resolution created a peacekeeping mission meant to oversee a referendum, but that referendum has not occurred. The conflict has pitted Morocco on one side against the Polisario, backed by Algeria, on the other. Diplomatically, Morocco was for some time in the minority within Africa on the issue, with many countries considering Western Sahara a colony (the UN, for additional context, lists it as a “Non-Self-Governing Territory”). Since the mid-1990s, however, as an infographic from the Moroccan news site Le 360 makes clear, the diplomatic pendulum has swung more and more towards Morocco’s side - both within Africa and beyond. Indeed, Morocco has achieved major diplomatic momentum in Europe in recent years, including landing French support in 2024. Mali’s shift, then, reflects a broader trend. Among the three countries that make up the Alliance of Sahel States (French acronym AES) - Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger - all three now endorse Morocco’s position.1
At the regional level, there are also at least two other overlapping contexts to consider:
Moroccan outreach to the Sahelian juntas: Morocco’s multifaceted outreach to various parts of Africa, including the Sahel, long predates the military coups that occurred in Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Niger between 2020 and 2023. That outreach includes diplomatic, economic, religious, and cultural dimensions. In the context of the Sahelian coups, though, Morocco has presented itself as a friendly and energetic partner for the new military authorities. In 2023, Morocco’s King Mohamed VI announced the Atlantic Initiative, a project envisioning an economic corridor connecting the Sahelian countries to the ocean through Western Sahara. In April 2025, the King met with the foreign ministers of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to discuss “accelerating” the project. The economic integration aspect has moved slowly, but Morocco’s political support for the Sahelian juntas matters; the juntas have deliberately distanced themselves from France, the European Union, and to some extent the United States (although that’s up and down under Trump), and the juntas have also pursued and explored various alternative partnerships with Russia and others, including Morocco.
Mali’s tensions with Algeria: The Malian junta has had significant diplomatic tensions with Morocco’s rival Algeria, especially since 2023. Contributing to those tensions are numerous factors: the Malian military’s capture of the far northern town of Kidal from rebels; the warm reception that some Malian rebels and dissidents (including the politically prominent Imam Mahmoud Dicko) have received in Algiers; and certain military incidents near the Algeria-Mali border, notably the disputed downing of a Malian drone by Algerian forces in March/April 2025. Notably, Algeria made conspicuous diplomatic overtures to the Malian junta’s peer rulers in Niger and Burkina Faso in February 2026, raising speculation that Algiers might be aiming to reconcile with Bamako as well - now, Mali’s move on Western Sahara diminishes the chance of any imminent reconciliation. It is interesting to see these subtle differences within the AES regarding foreign relations, although it seems that Niger in particular is finding ways to balance its relations with Morocco and Algeria.
I have been part of various fruitful conversations about Mali as a “skeletal” state - one with weak control on the ground and relatively limited resources. That weakness and brittleness has been on display during the country’s extended struggle simply to supply fuel to the capital amid a jihadist blockade that was seemingly only resolved through negotiations that were quite favorable to the jihadist side. At the same time, even a “skeletal” state has considerable room to maneuver, and to make and deepen friendships, in the international sphere.