Mali/Algeria: A Kidnapping, a Release, and Some Political Ramifications

Algiers seeks to maintain its credibility, Malian rebels highlight their role, and the Saharan kidnapping economy continues its twisting course.

On January 14, a Spanish citizen was kidnapped in the Assekrem plateau in Algeria’s Ahaggar National Park, some 80 kilometers north of the city of Tamanrasset (map). Three days earlier, an Austrian citizen was kidnapped in the northern Nigerien city of Agadez. The Spanish citizen was freed on January 21 and handed over to Spanish officials in Algiers the next day, while the Austrian citizen remains in kidnappers’ hands.

The journalist Wassim Nasr has relayed here what his contacts have told him about the two incidents - namely, that the Islamic State-Sahel (IS-Sahel) widely advertised that it is seeking Western hostages and will pay high prices for them, and so the two incidents were both perpetrated by bandits and opportunists hoping to fetch those payments. According to Nasr, the Austrian citizen was delivered to IS-Sahel while the Spanish citizen was tracked down through a combination of local community efforts and Algerian security efforts. The Spanish citizen was then released by his kidnappers into local arms around the Mali-Niger before being handed over to northern Mali’s main rebel coalition, the Azawad Liberation Front (French acronym FLA). The FLA then delivered the Spaniard to Algerian security services who then helped him return home. Nasr’s account tracks closely with what other outlets report, for example Jeune Afrique. The FLA’s own (brief) account is here.

For context, there was a lucrative industry of kidnapping Westerners in the Sahara-Sahel from approximately 2008-2013, affecting Mali and Niger in particular. There was also a mass kidnapping of tourists in the Algerian Sahara in 2003, which became a key turning point for the jihadist group then known as the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat and subsequently known as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM netted, at minimum, tens of millions of euros in ransom payments at the peak of the kidnapping spree.

Yet the kidnapping industry, at least in that form, partly burned itself out - in a sense, a victim of its own success. Tourism nosedived in Mali and the broader Sahara. The 2012-2013 rebellion in northern Mali (in which AQIM was a key participant) made the region even more unappealing to tourists, and AQIM ended up losing several top commanders and going on the run after France launched a military intervention in 2013. When the jihadist insurgency resurged and transformed, it was not in the pre-2012 mold of terrorist attacks but in a more complex form that centered on mass insurgency. Terrorist attacks have continued, and so have kidnappings, but the core of the conflict is now the day-in, day-out raids by jihadists against the security forces and against non-compliant civilians.

The kidnapping industry has continued, as I mentioned, but targets have shifted to prominent Sahelians, to longtime resident aid workers, and to sporadic shock kidnappings of Western tourists in zones previously considered safe. The kidnappings of locals have been tremendously impactful - Mali’s opposition leader Soumaïla Cissé was seized in 2020, for example, and was eventually exchanged (alongside three Westerners) for some two hundred jihadist fighters. More recently, earlier this month, the prominent Malian religious leader Amadou Hady Tall died in the custody of his jihadist kidnappers.

The kidnapping of the Austrian citizen fits into the second trend I mentioned, the taking of aid workers, missionaries, and other long-time Western residents of the Sahel. Grimly, such hostages taken in the post-2013 period have often been held for years; an American missionary snatched in 2016 in Niger spent 6.5 years with his captors, while a French citizen released alongside Cissé in 2020 had been held for nearly four years.

The third trend is the shock nabbing of tourists in zones adjacent to the main conflict theater, but considered safe - and so the Spanish citizen’s experience falls in this category, as does, for example, the 2019 kidnapping of two French citizens in a national park in Benin. One problem for tourists, of course, is that the “safe zone” is constantly shifting and is never one hundred percent safe, in any case.

Returning to the Spaniard’s kidnapping, it’s a sensitive incident for Algeria given that Algerian authorities (like most authorities!) want their country to be seen as secure and safe. That image of Algeria is meant to stand in contrast to (1) Algeria’s own past (the “Black Decade” of the 1990s, which saw 200,000 killed, according to the most common estimate, and also saw some grisly incidents involving foreigners) and (2) the insecurity in the Sahel.

The journalist Housseyne ag Issa has an insightful Twitter essay (in Arabic) about the narratives surrounding the Spaniard’s release. In particular ag Issa points to both how Algerian and Spanish official sources refrained from mentioning the FLA’s role in the transfer of the hostage. Ag Issa lists three reasons: (1) the FLA’s lack of international diplomatic standing; (2) an Algerian/Spanish desire to avoid boosting the FLA’s self-presentation as a security provider in the region; and (3) a desire to spotlight the role of Algerian security services.

For additional context, one could add that relations between Algeria and Mali are quite bad now. For years, some in Mali accused Algeria of backing both rebel and jihadist groups as a means of undermining Mali’s security and territorial integrity. The junta in power in Mali since 2020 has taken on confrontational diplomatic stances vis-a-vis Algeria, especially over Algeria’s interactions with rebel groups and critics of the junta. See here for an example of these kinds of accusations. The way this kidnapping played out, then, will only reinforce, in Bamako, allegations of collusion between the Algerian authorities and the FLA. (A late edit: here is an example of a pro-junta source arguing that the whole incident was “orchestrated.”)

For their part, it seems to me that the FLA wants to be seen as a benevolent actor here - they deny accepting payment, for example. Their spokesman told RFI, “We are against hostage-taking and against organized crime, so this touched upon our credibility.” The FLA also made sure to mediatize and publicize their role, releasing a communiqué and posing for several photographs with the released Spanish citizen. In the communiqué, the FLA highlighted the “professionalism and bravery” of its security forces, and stated the movement’s desire to “promote security and peace in the region.” The FLA also took a shot at the Malian junta and the junta’s allies in the Wagner Group, holding them responsible for the “chaotic situation” that enables kidnappings and crime. This moment became one chance, then, for the FLA to audition for a more recognized and respected role in northern Mali and beyond - although international recognition of Azawad remains a very remote prospect.