Muftis of Syria, Past and Present

An icon of traditionalism rises as the last Mufti of the Assad era pays a price.

In late March, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa appointed Osama al-Rifa’i as Syria’s new Mufti, and also announced the composition of the Fatwa Council (Majlis al-Ifta’). In Islamic law, a fatwa is a legal opinion delivered in response to a question, and a mufti is the one who gives the fatwa (plural fatawa). A fatwa is often considered non-binding, although when backed by state power and/or judicial power the fatwa can obviously have considerable force.

One of the most interesting dynamics in the majority-Muslim world now, I think, is different states’ use of what Nathan Brown and others have called “official Islam.” There are huge questions surrounding state-backed fatwa councils, ministries of Islamic affairs, and other institutions. Are states simply using shaykhs and institutions as props? Do these shaykhs and institutions exert a serious religious influence over states and societies? When do rulers defer to the shaykhs, and when do they ignore them? What happens to the credibility of the shaykhs involved in such projects? What kind of Islam is being elaborated? Such questions are important and fascinating amid Syria’s transition following the rebellion and takeover in 2024 that was led by al-Sharaa (Abu Muhammad al-Jolani) and the coalition led by his Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Syria Liberation Group).

Al-Rifa’i’s official website is down from what I see, but according to this biography of him from Al Jazeera, he was born in 1944 in Damascus. He is the son of a major shaykh of the twentieth century, Ahmad al-Rifa’i (d. 1973). The older al-Rifa’i founded an association called Jama‘at Zayd (Zayd’s Group, or perhaps the Community or Collective of Zayd), named after the Zayd bin Thabit Mosque where al-Rifa’i was the imam (Zayd bin Thabit was a Companion of the Prophet Muhammad). Jama’at Zayd became a hugely influential educational and charitable movement with a Sufi orientation. The scholar Thomas Pierret has written about Jama‘at Zayd in a standalone article and in his 2013 book on the shaykhs of Syria, looking at the Group’s complex relationship with the regime of Hafez al-Assad (1970-2000) and Bashar al-Assad (2000-2024); the regime sometimes allowed the movement greater latitude and sometimes less. Turning back to the younger al-Rifa’i, he received an Islamic education from his father and other major shaykhs of Syria, and also graduated with a degree in Arabic from the University of Damascus in 1971. Amid the Syrian uprising of 1976-1982, he went into exile in Saudi Arabia in 1981, returning to Syria only in 1993. He then supported the revolution of 2011, prompting the security forces to storm his mosque and beat him and other worshippers, resulting in his hospitalization followed by his departure to Turkey. From Istanbul, he organized al-Majlis al-Islami al-Suri (The Syrian Islamic Council) for dissident shaykhs.

The site Arabi21 (which I am not very familiar with, but appears to have Qatari funding) has a fairly long biography of him as well, framing him as a “Shafi’i Sufi” who is close to the Muslim Brotherhood and who opposes al-Qaida and the Islamic State. The Shafi’is are one of the four main legal schools in Sunni Islam; both the legal schools and especially Sufism are viewed with skepticism at the least, and hostility at the most, by Salafis. The kind of genealogical authority that al-Rifa’i draws upon is also at odds with Salafi conceptions of religious authority as more inherent in doctrinal “purity” and command over particular texts. Elevating al-Rifa’i then appears to fit within al-Sharaa’s broader approach of prioritizing a somewhat generic albeit Sunni-centric version of the new Syria, rather than chasing a narrowly Salafi identity. Worth noting is that al-Rifa’i’s appointment is facing criticism, Arabi21 says, from secularists who see him as a Sunni sectarian and also from Salafis who are concerned by his Sufism.

Meanwhile, al-Rifa’is appointment has been paralleled by a stark drop in fortunes for the final mufti of the Assad regime, Ahmad Hassoun (b. 1949). A strong supporter of the Assads, and formally in office from 2005-2021, Hassoun became a target of serious anger amid the revolution and civil war. That anger resurfaced this February as demonstrators gathered outside his home in Aleppo. He was then arrested in March at Damascus Airport while seeking to leave the country for medical treatment. At the link, which is from Al Jazeera, one can find a long although very critical biography of Hassoun and his rise (even as a Sunni shaykh) through the hierarchy of the Assad regime (father and son) through Bashar al-Assad’s abrupt decision to abolish the post of Mufti in 2021. Al Jazeera obviously has its own leanings, and the story is headlined “the Mufti of Barrels and Executions” - with “barrels,” I presume, referring to oil. referring to barrel bombs [thanks to a reader for this correction]. Between the protests, the arrest, and the hostile press coverage, Hassoun is yet another associate of al-Assad who is paying a high price in post-rebellion Syria.

There’s a powerful comparison to be made between the biographies of these two shaykhs of the same generation, who experienced Syria’s postcolonial history, through the revolution and its aftermath, in such different ways. For now it will be revealing to see how al-Rifa’i approaches the post of Mufti, how his relationship with al-Sharaa evolves, and whether he proves to be a symbol of inclusion, division, traditionalism, change, or something else.