Protests and Rumors of Regime Change in Iran: A Roundup

Leading analysts expect the authorities to endure for now, even as desperation grows and new flashpoints loom.

Protests began in Iran on December 28, motivated especially by a fall in value of the Iranian rial, surging inflation, and a broader economic crisis. As of late January, the protests appear to be fading amid massive repression, although a continued internet blackout constrains access to information. Upwards of 5,000 people have been killed. Repression will now flow partly through the courts. Iran’s Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei has stated, “Our main work at the judiciary about the recent developments has just started,” an apparent reference to trials and asset seizures affecting detained protesters.

In Iran, in the United States, and beyond, the protests triggered tremendous speculation about whether the fall of the Iranian authorities was near. For me, the most compelling analyses are those saying that a full-scale revolution, collapse of the system, or other major shake-up are not the likeliest outcome. Here are some of those arguments:

• At the Stimson Center, journalist Shahir Shahidsaless proposes a fascinating comparison between the 1979 revolution and twenty-first-century protest waves (2009, 2022, 2025-6), especially in terms of how information flows affect popular mobilization. He argues that in 1979, “Ideological certainty swallowed plurality,” permitting a level of cohesion and participation that overthrew the Shah but that also brought what he calls “mass misjudgment, in which mobilization propelled the country toward outcomes fundamentally opposed to the revolution’s declared aims of freedom and independence.” He contrasts 1979 with contemporary Iran, which “is saturated with information. Social media, encrypted messaging apps, satellite television, exile outlets, and ubiquitous citizen reporting generate a dense, decentralized public sphere. Competing narratives circulate rapidly; no single authority monopolizes interpretation. This same environment that preserves independence of judgment also generates structural fragmentation.”

• On Twitter, Sina Toossi of the Center for International Policy penned a long essay reflecting on two reports in the Financial Times, one a contribution from analyst Azadeh Moaveni. Toossi says, “As Moaveni writes with devastating clarity, ‘economic fury runs through every recent moment of clamour in Iran like a guiding line.’ In my view, this context also helps explain why many desperate Iranians have latched onto [would-be Shah] Reza Pahlavi, who promises an easy path to normalcy and a better future, urged people to overtake government institutions, and strongly implied that foreign military intervention was imminent and that he himself was preparing to return to Iran. I would argue that what has borne out instead is that Pahlavi functions as a placeholder for desperation rather than as a movement leader capable of sustaining or protecting a mass uprising.” Moaveni’s report is here, and here is the FT’s piece on the authorities’ retaking of the streets.

• Equator magazine interviews the scholar Arang Keshavarzian of New York University, who also points to the inchoate character - but growing popular appeal - of Pahlavism. He comments, “In this context, ‘Make Iran Great Again’ is a powerful, if vacuous, message resonating among many Iranians who feel they’re out of options.” Regarding the short-term future, Keshavarzian says, “Even if protesters go home and the so-called apolitical ‘grey’ strata of the population remains unmoved, I don’t see these energies dissipating. There are so many challenges facing Iranian society. Even if the government makes some reforms in the next couple of months, citizens will inevitably make a new round of claims. The streets are likely to remain a battleground in certain neighborhoods and towns – especially among younger protesters and in the evenings. I expect that 40th-day ceremonies commemorating those killed in the protests will offer another set of flash points.” This reference to the “grey” strata in Iran evokes, for me, Professor Lisa Wedeen’s discussion, in her book Authoritarian Apprehensions, of “gray people” in 2010s Syria.

• For even more on the Pahlavi question, we can flash back to the Khatoun Journal’s post from October 2025, which the author calls “required reading before having an opinion on current events in Iran.” The post, based heavily on the work of the historian Ervand Abrahamian and on contemporaneous reports from Amnesty International and other sources, lays out the depth and breadth of torture by the secret police under the Shah in the 1970s. The author writes, “The past is not past when its propaganda is repackaged as memory. Nostalgia in this context is not just delusion. It is counter-insurgency. It is the erasure of struggle and the re-legitimization of the torturer.”

• Hamidreza Azizi at his site Iran Analytica: “The central question is not whether the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] could overthrow the system it has helped build, but how power is structured, mediated, and constrained within that system; especially under conditions of succession and crisis…Over the past several years, the Guards have lost senior commanders who combined military authority with political weight and elite networking power. Qasem Soleimani, while primarily responsible for external operations, was not detached from domestic politics. More recently, the removal of senior figures such as Hossein Salami, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, Mohammad Hossein Bagheri, and Gholam Ali Rashid has further narrowed the pool of commanders capable of bridging coercive power and elite bargaining. The cumulative effect has not been to make the IRGC more coup-prone, but rather to leave it with fewer consensus brokers.”

• An anonymous writer for the Guardian: “The possibility of the Islamic republic collapsing is far-fetched. This political entity has roots in many social groups and a dedicated base that will stick with it through thick and thin. The Islamic republic is likely to remain, and one can assume when it is presented with such massive and widespread demonstration – backed by foreign powers – its paranoia gains fresh currency. The state starts to see itself under existential threat, putting up its guard and more vociferously relegating any voice for change. Which, of course, leads to another round of civil unrest in the near future. Unless the Iranian state begins giving way to meaningful, fundamental changes, what one can see awaiting Iran is repetitive recursion of social unrest on the one side, and shows of force by the state on the other. A circle of attrition whereby the country erodes and sinks down, instead of moving towards a democratic form of politics.”

Finally, on a related note, the battles over who can speak about Iran, and how, are intensifying within the United States. The Middle East Studies Association (MESA) has publicly raised the case of Professor Shirin Saeidi at the University of Arkansas, who was removed as the director of the University’s King Fahd Center for Middle East Studies. MESA writes, “There is good reason to believe that this decision was politically motivated and taken primarily because of Professor Saeidi’s speech, thereby violating the principles of academic freedom, her First Amendment rights and university policy. We are also concerned that the university may have violated its own procedural rules in removing Professor Saeidi from her position as center director.” The case has broader implications - Saiedi is part of a cohort of Iran scholars who, over roughly the past decade, have considerably advanced understanding of Iran’s post-1979 history. Without their voices, the conversation about Iran would be flatter and poorer, all at a pivotal moment for Iran (and the United States).