Seven Questions for Abdi Guled on Somali Politics

A veteran journalist discusses Somalia's national and sub-national politics, and comments on Turkey and China's roles in the Horn of Africa.

Abdi Guled is a veteran journalist and consultant based in Mogadishu, Somalia, with bylines in the Associated Press, Reuters, and the Wall Street Journal, among other outlets. I’ve learned a great deal from his commentary on Twitter. He generously agreed to answer my questions about dynamics in Mogadishu, Jubaland, Puntland, Somaliland, and more.

AT: Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is a bit past the halfway mark of his second administration. What do his supporters say about him? What do his critics say?

AG: Supporters of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud often praise his administration's focus on addressing Somalia’s security challenges, particularly the stalled fight against Al-Shabaab. His "total war" strategy, initiated in 2022, has involved significant military offensives alongside grassroots mobilization of local militias (Ma’awisley) and cooperation with international partners like the U.S. and Turkey. Proponents credit him for strengthening diplomatic ties, including Somalia's potential inclusion in regional blocs like the East African Community (EAC) and reinvigorating Somalia’s economy through initiatives such as debt relief discussions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Critics argue that Mohamud’s administration has fallen short on delivering tangible outcomes, particularly in consolidating federalism, reversal of territorial gains made in the stalled anti al-Shabab military operations and building trust among Somalia’s regional states. They accuse him of prioritizing power centralization in Mogadishu at the expense of federal member states. Furthermore, the ongoing clan-based favoritism in appointments and resource allocation remains a contentious issue. Critics also highlight his limited success in addressing Somalia’s humanitarian crises and the slow pace of security sector reform. The ongoing clan-based political tensions and disputes over federalism have fueled opposition. Detractors also highlight corruption allegations within his administration and claim his focus on centralization has overshadowed security efforts to address Somalia’s dire humanitarian crisis, including famine and displacement. Moreover, critics accuse Mohamud of favoring certain clans, deepening political divides.

AT: What is the nature of the conflict between President Mohamud and Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe? Where do things stand now after the clashes in December?

AG: The tension between Mohamud and Madobe stems from Somalia's federal structure. Madobe, a key regional leader in Jubaland, has long resisted centralized control from Mogadishu, seeking greater autonomy. The rivalry intensified during disputes over election processes, clan representation, and resource allocation. The escalating tensions intensified when Madobe rejected President Mohamud's proposal for popular elections and walked out of the National Consultative Council (NCC) summit in Mogadishu, adamantly insisting on holding indirect elections instead. He also dismissed the president's offer of a one-year term extension. Upon returning to Kismayo, Madobe announced his plans to proceed with indirect elections, further deepening the divide. Mohamud has accused Madobe of harboring ambitions to assert too much independence, undermining federal authority. Madobe, in turn, has criticized Mogadishu for interfering in Jubaland's internal affairs.

Tensions between the federal government and Jubaland intensified following contentious regional elections that clashed with President Mohamud's broader election plans. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) then covertly deployed troops to Raskamboni after securing the support of local island administration leaders previously aligned with Jubaland, an action widely perceived as an ambitious attempt to remove Madobe's authority through military force. The FGS claimed the deployment aimed to take over military bases vacated by departing African Union (AU) forces, a justification dismissed by Jubaland, which accused the federal government of planning an invasion. In response, Jubaland mobilized thousands of troops and military hardware to retake the area, swiftly routing federal forces within hours nearly one month after their deployment. The December clashes between federal forces and Jubaland’s regional troops were a manifestation of these unresolved disputes. In November 2024, Jubaland suspended cooperation with the federal government, citing constitutional violations, a schism which highlights the broader challenges of federalism and regional autonomy within Somalia.

After the December 2024 clashes in Raskamboni island, tensions have somewhat de- escalated. THE AU, UN, U.S Turkey and UAE reportedly tried to mediate discussions, encouraging both sides to pursue dialogue. However, distrust remains high, with Madobe still wary of Mohamud's intentions to limit Jubaland’s autonomy. While a fragile peace holds, underlying disputes over federalism and clan dynamics persist. Deployment of FGS troops in towns in Gedo in a strategic pivot after the Raskamboni setback also heightened tensions with JL accuses FGS of still planning to interfere in its internal affairs.

AT: How are relations between President Mohamud and Puntland President Said Deni?

AG: Relations between President Mohamud and Deni have remained tense since the 2022 elections, following a fallout between the former allies. The rift reportedly stemmed primarily from Mohamud reneging on a pre-election agreement that would have appointed Deni as prime minister, a pact that had been key to their political alliance in unseating former President Farmajo. The tensions have been further exacerbated by Puntland's push for greater autonomy and dissatisfaction with the federal government’s approach to resource-sharing. Puntland has accused Mohamud’s administration of consolidating power in Mogadishu and disregarding Puntland’s leadership role within Somalia’s federal framework, fueling ongoing disputes over governance and federalism. Puntland also declared itself a de facto independent state, withdrawing recognition of the federal government, a move which underscores the complexities in Somalia's federal structure and the challenges in achieving national unity.

AT: How serious is the threat of the Islamic State in Puntland and in Somalia more broadly?

AG: ISIS in Somalia, primarily based in the mountainous Bari region of Puntland, remains a significant threat but operates on a smaller scale compared to Al-Shabaab. ISIS has carried out assassinations, bombings, and extortion in Puntland, exploiting local clan disputes to expand its influence. Puntland’s ongoing military offensives have targeted ISIS camps, resulting in the destruction of key bases and the killing of several fighters, including foreign operatives.

While Al-Shabaab dominates as the primary militant group, ISIS remains a disruptive force. The group has sought to recruit disillusioned Al-Shabaab members, leveraging grievances against the federal government. However, its limited territorial control and resources constrain its operations. Puntland’s successes in countering ISIS have been notable but require sustained support to prevent a resurgence.

AT: How effective do you think the new African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) will be?

AG: AUSSOM commenced operations on January 1, 2025, succeeding the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). The mission's effectiveness will depend on adequate funding, clear mandates, and coordination with Somali security forces. The inclusion of troops from countries like Egypt (not yet finalized), following Somalia's request, adds a new dimension to the mission's composition and regional dynamics.

Challenges:

• Insufficient funding and reliance on international donors limit its operational capacity.

• Somalia’s reliance on clan militias creates inconsistencies in its stabilization strategy.

• Al-Shabaab’s resilience continues to test the mission’s ability to secure liberated areas.

Effectiveness:

AUSSOM has had mixed results. While it primarily aims at supporting successful offensives in areas like Hirshabelle and Galmudug, it may struggle to maintain security in liberated zones due to limited Somali government capacity. AUSSOM’s effectiveness depends heavily on international support and the Somali government’s ability to sustain post-conflict governance.

AT: What is your assessment of Somaliland's internal stability?

AG: Somaliland faces increasing political tensions, particularly after the controversial postponement of presidential elections in 2024. Clashes in Las Anod, a disputed town claimed by Puntland, have exposed internal divisions and weakened its image as a stable, self-governing entity.

While Somaliland remains relatively peaceful compared to southern Somalia, these issues along with the proliferation of armed militias (currently 3 exist) threaten its long-standing stability. Internal clan dynamics and disputes over electoral processes have highlighted governance weaknesses. Somaliland’s ability to maintain stability depends on resolving these internal challenges while balancing aspirations for international recognition.

AT: Who do you see as the most pivotal international actor in the Horn now, and why?

AG: Turkey. Turkey has emerged as a key player in the Horn of Africa due to its investments in infrastructure, security, and humanitarian assistance, particularly in Somalia. Turkey’s mediation efforts between Ethiopia and Somalia over Somaliland have underscored its role as a regional power broker. Additionally, Turkey’s long-standing military support for Somalia, including the establishment of a military training base in Mogadishu, has solidified its influence.

Why Turkey? Turkey’s blend of soft power (economic aid, cultural diplomacy) and hard power (security cooperation) gives it a unique position to shape outcomes in the Horn. Its ability to mediate conflicts and build strategic partnerships makes it a pivotal actor in a region marked by competition from global powers like China and the U.S.

China also emerges as the most pivotal international actor in the Horn of Africa, driven by its strategic investments in infrastructure, trade, and diplomacy. Its Belt and Road Initiative projects, particularly in Djibouti and Ethiopia, underscore its influence in regional geopolitics.

Meanwhile, the United States remains a key (#1) security partner, focusing on counterterrorism and democratic governance.

However, China’s economic leverage increasingly shapes the Horn’s trajectory, particularly as countries like Somalia and Ethiopia seek alternatives to Western aid.