Seven Questions for Jérôme Drevon on Jihadi Politics in Syria and Beyond

"The practical aspects of governance tend to prevail over other ideological debates."

Dr. Jérôme Drevon, Senior Analyst in Jihad and Modern Conflict at the International Crisis Group, recently published a new book entitled From Jihad to Politics: How Syrian Jihadis Embraced Politics. The book is available in open access format.

Drevon is one of the most interesting researchers working on jihadism today. He generously agreed to answer a few questions about the book. Here is our interview, conducted via email:

AT: Your book deals primarily with two Syrian armed groups - Jabhat al-Nusra (and its successors, particularly Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham or HTS) and Ahrar al-Sham. For readers who may be new to the Syrian conflict, how did these groups emerge?

JD: The emergence of Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham during the Syrian conflict can be traced back to two distinct paths, which very much influenced how these groups’ evolved later on, more than any other ideological difference.

The story of Jabhat al-Nusra begins with its leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, who was an Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) commander, the predecessor of Islamic State. Looking at the popular uprising in Syria in early 2011, al-Jolani, who is Syrian, sought to leave Iraq and join the fight back home. He  proposed a plan to the ISI leadership and received their approval to operate in Syria, albeit with only limited financial and material support. Upon arriving in Syria, al-Jolani gathered militants close to him or his associates and established Jabhat al-Nusra, which started as a small group focusing on high-profile attacks. Over time, it grew significantly and became one of the most prominent player in the Syrian conflict. Jabhat al-Nusra later split from IS, as it sought to follow its own agenda in Syria and opposed IS’s more radical politics against other groups and minorities. Eventually, Jabhat al-Nusra rebranded itself as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) when it split from al-Qaeda in 2016.

Ahrar al-Sham's formation was more grass-root and decentralised. At the onset of the uprising, various militants, some with previous experience in jihad abroad, began thinking about the militarisation of the initially non-violent protests. While they did not oppose non-violent means, they doubted its effectiveness against the Assad regime's brutality. These militants engaged in discussions with Salafis, local activists, and other like-minded individuals. They began forming brigades within their respective areas, recruiting friends and local supporters. These individual brigades eventually united under the umbrella of Ahrar al-Sham, which then expanded its influence and operations to become one of the main actor of the Syrian armed opposition.

AT: You write that Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham "consciously distanced themselves from Salafi Jihadi jingoism" (p. 2). Later, you add that many of your interviewees were "seeking a way out of the Salafi Jihadi deadlock, which, they thought, could never achieve its strategic objectives" (p. 4). Could you explain more about what you mean?

JD: Initially, the militants were not opposed to jihad, including what we refer to as Jihadi Salafism, and supported the idea of establishing an Islamic state governed by their principles, distinct from Western democracies. However, they also saw what happened in many Muslim countries where Jihadis got involved, particularly in Iraq, and opposed the violent excesses and internal conflicts associated with Salafi jihadism. In Iraq, they saw militants excommunicating each other, fighting the local population, and enforcing harsh rule over them, which ultimately turned civilians against these groups. Both Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra recognised that these excesses were counterproductive and unlikely to lead to any lasting strategic objective. Instead, they thought that the Syrian conflict was an opportunity to try something different and avoid the excesses that had plagued Jihadis beforehand.

AT: Could you tell us about a breakthrough moment or intellectual insight you had during your fieldwork?

JD: More than a breakthrough, what was very clear during my fieldwork early on is that many researchers’ excessive focus on ideology, doctrines, and theological texts overlooks a much more critical, yet ignored aspect: the practical management of these groups as large political organisations. In private, armed groups’ leaders and commanders spend more time discussing institutional matters, including their decision-making processes, organisation of their internal structures, and the management of internal and external pressure than theology per se. I don’t say that theology or ideology does not matter, but it is clearly not their daily obsession. Ultimately, although they are armed groups conducting military operations, they are first of all fundamentally political organisations grappling with challenges similar to those faced by other political grouping, such as political parties. The practical aspects of governance tend to prevail over other ideological debates.

AT: So many events and narratives have been questioned and disputed in the Syrian conflict - how do you, as a researcher, try to verify information? How do you decide what is a plausible account versus a conspiracy theory?

JD: The key to understanding what happens in the Syrian conflict is to multiply sources and cross-check everything. I made a point to consult a wide range of individuals, including armed group members, their opponents, dissidents, and people at various levels of responsibility. I also checked their communiqués and statements to verify that I took everything in consideration, including what they tell their own people. Additionally, I rely heavily on the excellent work done by Syrian and foreign researchers and journalists over the years.

While I may still make mistakes, I try to represent the perspectives of different actors and base my findings on as much evidence as I can gather. Simplistic ideas, whether from some in the West or even among insurgents themselves, who occasionally see everything as part of "international intelligence", fail to capture the complexity of these conflicts, and how much they are driven by very local issues. Reality is often murky, doesn't follow a straightforward plan, and frequently leads to unintended outcomes.

AT: Do you think any non-Syrian jihadi groups might move in a similar direction to HTS and Ahrar al-Sham? You write, "The armed opposition in Syria presents a relatively unique case of advanced internal and external institutionalisation" (p. 16). And you also write, "[Some Syrian armed groups] have come to realise that the uncontrolled implementation of Salafi Jihadi ideas can only lead to a stalemate, hindering the achievement of any lasting political objectives. This new direction is also a result of the structural configuration of the war. Unlike many conflicts against foreign occupation, the Syrian war is essentially a battle for domestic authority" (p. 201). You also briefly discuss armed groups in Mali and Somalia (p. 206) as possible, although unlikely, parallels to HTS and Ahrar al-Sham. What signposts should observers look for that might indicate groups elsewhere are moving in an HTS-like direction?

JD: When we do comparative politics as opposed to, let’s say, historical analysis, the focus is not merely on explaining a particular case study. We want to identify whether there are broader factors that can explain a phenomena across cases. This means that we have to understand whether the characteristics we observe in a specific case, such as the evolution of these Syrian groups, are caused by the personalities of their leaders or if they are shaped by external circumstances that might apply to other cases as well. In the case of HTS, there is often a tendency to personalise the analysis by attributing the group's trajectory to the actions and decisions of its leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani. While this has some merits, it risks overlooking the broader context and structural factors that Jolani and other leaders have had to navigate. But only those other factors can help us understand the extent to which what happened in Syria can happen elsewhere.

In Syria, several factors contributed to Jihadis’ politicisation: the multitude of groups, which forced them to collaborate with one another, the need to differentiate themselves from IS when the Iraqi groups started to launch war against virtually everyone, and the necessity of managing local populations. Also extremely important has been these groups’ reliance on Turkey for survival and alignment – de facto – with Western interests, as long as they distance themselves from al-Qaeda and IS.

Replicating this approach in other regions is challenging. For example, in West Africa, groups like JNIM have explicitly stated their focus on regional issues, deliberately avoiding attacks outside their immediate area, including against France. In contrast, al-Shabaab in Somalia has shown more ambiguity, with past claims of planning attacks abroad. But, these groups still seek to overturn the regional order, potentially challenging existing state boundaries. Unlike the Syrian groups, they do not share a common enemy with Western countries, even as the latter has issues with military juntas in West Africa. There is therefore less room for ambiguity for Western countries compared to the situation in Syria to accommodate them to some extent (at least to avoid targeting them). In addition, these groups do not rely on external support for survival, nor do they face pressure from another state, which could have otherwise influenced their course.

At the same time, contrary to those who argue that ideas—like al-Qaeda as an idea—cannot die, I strongly believe otherwise. I can recognise that some groups, including their leaders and commanders, remain loyal to al-Qaeda. For them, al-Qaeda is not just an idea; it's also a system of solidarity among groups with similar world views. However, I believe that al-Qaeda as an idea has lost much of its relevance for more than a decade. In the past, affiliating with al-Qaeda made sense. It conferred a certain reputation, and the strategy—however flawed—was coherent: you aimed to topple local regimes supported by the West by striking the West itself, forcing it to withdraw so you could then confront these regimes on your own terms. It was naive, but consistent in a way.

Today, however, al-Qaeda no longer makes sense as an idea. One of the main obstacle to establishing Islamic states in many regions—perhaps not the only one, but a significant one—is precisely these groups' affiliation with the organisation. Ironically, this affiliation with al-Qaeda has become the primary impediment to achieving the very objectives the organization set out to accomplish.

If we look for signs of change, we have to look at groups prioritising local governance and domestic authority over global jihad, engaging in negotiations, perhaps even forming some sort of alliance with regional powers, and showing restraint in international attacks. Such signs suggest a strategic shift similar to what we've seen in Syria. This exist, to a limited extent, in West Africa. However, achieving a similar outcome as Syria, including perhaps through negotiations, will be much more challenging.

AT: Personally, I've almost given up on jihadism studies - the field appears, to me, filled with agenda-driven analysis that peddles alarmism in the hopes of justifying large Western government counterterrorism budgets. Work like yours gives me hope and rekindles my intellectual curiosity about this topic, particularly because you take your interviewees and subjects seriously as people. But this kind of work also appears quite rare to me. Or perhaps I'm too negative! What is your assessment of the field of jihadism studies?

JD: There is indeed a growing body of research on Jihadi groups, but many studies – obviously not all of them – tend to repeat familiar lines. One of the main issues, which is not unique to this field, is the tendency for researchers to limit their reading and engagement to their specific area of study. They read on Jihadis and write on Jihadis, but not much else. As a result, they lack interdisciplinary engagement, which can stifle originality and new insights.

For instance, if you study gangs and only read about gangs, or focus solely on leftist groups when studying leftist movements, or restrict yourself to jihadism studies when examining Jihadis, you risk missing valuable insights from other cases. I found it particularly enlightening to read about the transformation of the IRA in Northern Ireland or the dynamics of mafia and gang organisations for instance. These readings help us recognise that, despite their ideological commitments, these groups share significant similarities with other violent political organisations.

Drawing comparisons and understanding similarities and differences is crucial to better comprehend how these groups operate and evolve. This also helps to shifts the focus away from their ideologies only, which, while important, are not the sole drivers of their actions. Instead, we should ask: what is the practical impact of their beliefs? How are they translated in practice?

My advice to researchers in this field is to expand their reading and consider studies on various types of organisations. This broader perspective can help us see that many behaviours and strategies are common across different groups, regardless of what they stand for.

AT: I've struggled, too, with a lot of political science accounts of armed conflict, many of which feel too schematic to me. What do you think political science theories of conflict get right and wrong about the war in Syria? Whose work offered the most insight into what you saw in the field, and why?

JD: These issues are pervasive in the study of armed conflicts in political science, beyond Syria. In civil war studies, there is often a heavy emphasis on quantitative methods and methodological rigour, especially in the U.S. but also increasingly in Europe. While some of these research [projects] are important and useful, they sometimes leads to conclusions that are either obvious or false empirically, despite being methodologically sound. Another challenge is the difficulty of engaging directly with actors in the field, resulting in a heavy reliance on secondary sources or the propaganda published by the groups themselves (which is usually not very interesting).

In the context of Syria, I've found that journalists, especially Syrians, often provide the best insights. Books like No Turning Back, Brothers of the Gun, Au coeur des révoltes arabes: Devenir révolutionnaires and others offer perspectives that academic studies sometimes miss. Literature and novels can also convey some of the complexities of these conflicts much more effectively than academic research.

Regarding academic research, I will not mention everything since I will certainly forget good books too. But I liked in particular Bellamy’s Syria Betrayed on the UN political process, Mazur’s Revolution in Syria responding to why different communities reacted differently in 2011, Phillips’ Battle for Syria on foreign intervention, and Lister’s Syrian Jihad as the first overview of the insurgency through the lens of al-Qaeda and IS (on this see also Hamming’s Jihadi Politics, which covers Syria and beyond).

(That’s the interview. If you’re interested in reading more of Drevon’s work, see his earlier book on Egypt as well as his many articles and reports. - AT)