Seven Questions on Libyan Politics for Dr. Salam Said
"Favoritism and corruption have disproportionately benefited close allies and family members of ruling elites in both eastern and western Libya, thereby entrenching clientelist structures."
Dr. Salam Said directs the Libya office of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and also leads the foundation’s project on socially just economic policies in the Middle East and North Africa. Her article “Militia Chess,” published in International Politics and Society in June, was one of the clearest examinations of Libyan politics that I have read recently. She kindly agreed to answer some of my follow-up questions. Here is our interview:
AT: How would you characterize Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh's political approach? What are his most important accomplishments - and failures - since 2021?
SS: Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh’s political approach since 2021 can be summarized in three main areas. First, he has prioritized security in Tripoli by forging power-sharing agreements with influential militias in Western Libya. These militias were integrated into state security institutions and given key roles within civil administration and state-owned enterprises, helping stabilize the capital while securing their loyalty. However, the clashes among these militias in Tripoli in mid-May revealed that this approach failed to ensure lasting security. Instead of building a unified national force, militias were incorporated as whole units rather than as individuals, preserving their loyalty to their leaders and allowing them to operate like militias despite official status. For Dbeibeh, securing these militias’ support to protect his position took precedence over forming a national army with a shared identity.
Second, Dbeibeh has worked to maintain international recognition and regional backing, particularly from Turkey. While addressing European concerns by controlling irregular migration and securing investments in the lucrative oil and gas sector, he has continued to safeguard Turkey’s geopolitical interests through military and economic cooperation.
Third, the government has pursued, on the one hand, a neoliberal economic agenda emphasizing subsidy cuts, privatization of state enterprises, and the attraction of private investment. On the other hand, it has implemented state employment and social policies that function as instruments of patronage, rewarding loyalists and sustaining clientelist networks rather than constituting a genuine social contract. Consequently, both the number of state employees and expenditures on salaries and social funds have risen sharply. The Libyan state, with a population of approximately 7 million, employs over 2 million individuals and disburses salaries and pensions that include a large number of ghost workers. Meanwhile, low-income populations outside these networks continue to experience systemic social inequality and exclusion. Favoritism and corruption have disproportionately benefited close allies and family members of ruling elites in both eastern and western Libya, thereby entrenching clientelist structures.
Although Dbeibeh has preserved some stability in Tripoli over the past four years, most of his promises to Libyans remain unfulfilled. Socio-economic progress, political freedoms, elections, and civil society empowerment have largely failed to materialize. Instead, his administration has used populist rhetoric on migration and foreign policy to appeal to nationalist and conservative sentiments, while restricting civil society, repressing political opponents, and marginalizing women. Some social programs aimed at youth have been introduced to boost popularity, but ongoing poor governance, corruption, and social exclusion have fueled public dissatisfaction, culminating in protests demanding his resignation following the May clashes.
Dbeibeh has also notably failed to advance transitional justice. According to Amnesty International and numerous human rights organizations, Libya continues to suffer from impunity and a lack of an independent judiciary. The transitional justice process, intended to provide a fair new start after [Muammar] Gaddafi’s fall, has been largely ignored. Perpetrators of massacres—such as those in Tarhuna and elsewhere—committed by militias in both east and west Libya remain unaccountable. Alarmingly, some war criminals convicted by the International Criminal Court have even been released with the transitional government’s support, including figures like [Osama] Najem.
A particular failure of Dbeibeh’s government has been increasing women’s participation. Beyond the very limited number of women in key positions, many are token figures meant to satisfy the UN and international community with little real influence. Women in political positions face social and political repression that threatens their safety and that of their families, while women in general encounter restrictions on their freedom of movement, such as travel without a mahram (male family member).
AT: In your recent piece "Militia Chess," you discuss the killing of militia leader Abdel Ghani al-Kikli or "Ghnewa," a former ally of Dbeibeh. You write that "with Ghnewa out of the picture...other problematic militias are now stepping into his place. Dbeibeh relies on groups like these to protect himself from retaliation by Ghnewa’s allies." Could you tell us about some of these militias that are filling the vacuum?
SS: The landscape of armed groups in Western Libya is highly complex, with alliances and rivalries shaped by intricate dynamics. According to Libya researcher Wolfram Lacher, around 10 armed groups were active in Tripoli’s official security sector in 2024, down from over 500 groups identified in the city by a 2013 UNMSIL report.
The Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) under Gheniwa and the Special Deterrence Apparatus (RADA) under [Abdul Raouf] Kara seek to maintain autonomy, secure funding, and protect local power bases. Through clientelism and control of key state companies in electricity, oil, and telecoms, SSA has built strong influence, especially in Abu Salim. This growing power challenges Prime Minister Dbeibeh both economically and militarily.
To counter them, Dbeibeh leans on Brigade 444—a Libyan Army unit led by Mahmoud Hamza, a former Special Deterrence Forces commander, and long-time rival of Gheniwa. He also announced plans to dissolve SSA and RADA into Ministry of Interior structures, branding them “outlaw groups.” After Gheniwa’s death in May 2025, Brigade 444 quickly moved to seize his Tripoli territories, further consolidating Dbeibeh’s control.
AT: You also discuss General Khalifa Haftar in your piece. Who are the key groups and individuals in his camp currently?
SS: In contrast to western Libya, General Khalifa Haftar has successfully consolidated control over more than 50 armed groups in eastern Libya by integrating them into the centralized Libyan National Army (LNA), which he commands alongside his son, the Chief of Staff of the ground forces. He currently exerts de facto control over approximately two-thirds of Libya’s territory, maintaining his authority through repression and a power structure founded on three principal pillars.
Politically, Haftar wields influence over the Tobruk-based House of Representatives and an internationally unrecognized parallel government in the east. Economically, his forces receive salaries funded through the state budget via an arrangement with the Government of National Unity, while a complex clientelist network grants Haftar and his family privileged access to state resources. A notable example is the extra-budgetary Fund for Development and Reconstruction, overseen by his son Belkacem and ratified by Haftar’s loyal parliament.
Regionally, Haftar benefits from the support of Russia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and France, all of whom have vested geopolitical and economic interests in Libya. Recently, Turkey, traditionally aligned with western Libya, has increased its economic cooperation with Haftar, particularly in investment and commercial ventures.
AT: Predictions are very difficult, of course, but given Haftar's advanced age, what impact do you think his death would have on Libya? Do you think his sons or other close allies could hold his coalition together?
SS: Haftar’s death is unlikely to significantly alter the current power structure. He has seven children, several of whom hold key positions that ensure the continuity of his influence. His two sons, Saddam and Khaled, occupy important leadership roles within the Libyan National Army. Another son, Belkacem, heads the Fund for Development and Reconstruction and plays a significant political role. Additionally, two other sons are active in the private sector worldwide, particularly in real estate, helping to expand the family’s clientelist business network. In essence, Haftar has established a family-led power structure that is well-positioned to endure beyond his lifetime.
AT: Another major rival of Dbeibah is Aguila Saleh - how would you describe the latter's role in Libyan politics presently? What are Saleh's aims and goals?
SS: In my view, Aguila Saleh is not a direct rival of Dbeibah but is firmly aligned with the eastern camp. He aims either to retain his current position by influencing the upcoming elections or to secure a significant role in Libya’s post-election political landscape. Saleh’s interests closely align with Haftar’s, as both seek to consolidate power and maintain their influence in the country’s future.
AT: What is the current balance of power in southern Libya? Who are the key powerbrokers there now?
SS: Haftar currently controls southern Libya, with local militias integrated into the LNA, which has strengthened his influence across the region. Southern Libya is strategically important as a key migration route and hosts an expanded Russian military base supporting Russia’s Africa Corps operations. Haftar’s son, Belkacem, who heads the Reconstruction Fund, has repeatedly pledged substantial investments in the south to consolidate economic and political power and increase popular support.
However, Haftar governs through repression, and like the western government, the eastern administration has largely failed to deliver essential public services, develop infrastructure, or improve socioeconomic conditions—especially in access to electricity, water, education, and healthcare. As a result, the apparent stability maintained by military force is fragile, and tensions are likely to rise, making renewed protests and unrest a matter of when, not if.
AT: What and who are the main obstacles to holding free and fair elections in Libya?
SS: The main obstacles to holding free and fair elections in Libya are both technical and political.
From a technical standpoint, organizing simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections within a short timeframe has proven unrealistic due to the country’s lack of competent institutions and a restricted space for civil society. Political parties, marginalized since 2014, remain too fragile, and a consensual electoral law is still lacking. Moreover, Libya’s constitution has never been fully ratified, further complicating the electoral process.
Politically, the deadlock is rooted in the interests of the current ruling elite on both sides of the country. The transitional agreement of the Berlin Process 2021 barred anyone holding office during the transitional phase from running in permanent government or presidential elections, aiming to prevent the abuse of transitional positions to secure power in the new government and state institutions. However, this has incentivized those in power—such as members of parliament and the presidential council—to prolong the transitional period and avoid elections that would end their tenure. Rival leaders like Dbeibah in the west and Haftar in the east share a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, consolidating their economic and political power through patronage networks and repression, as previously mentioned. Also, other eligibility criteria for candidacy would exclude prominent figures such as Haftar and Saif al-Islam [Gaddafi], who therefore oppose fair and transparent elections. Together, these factors make free and fair elections in Libya extremely difficult to achieve.
The other side of the coin, institutionalizing and legitimizing these controversial figures by allowing them to participate in elections they might manipulate is not the right solution. Instead, it is crucial to implement consequences for spoilers like Haftar and Dbeibah through targeted personal sanctions and to enforce international court verdicts—especially against those implicated in human rights violations. Sanctions should be imposed on individuals responsible for crimes against humanity or those who have severely plundered state resources.
Last month, there was a revival of the Berlin Process initiative led by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), aiming to break the political deadlock and advance the electoral process. Some of the conditions from the 2021 Berlin Process were adjusted in this effort. This initiative, based on extensive consultations with Libyan actors, is scheduled to be presented to the UN Security Council on August 20–21 by Hanna S. Tetteh, head of UNSMIL.
While this might offer a glimmer of hope for Libyans, many—including myself—remain skeptical about its effectiveness unless there are meaningful consequences for those who violate the rules. Libya does not need another transitional government; what it truly needs are fair and transparent elections after 14 years of transition toward peace and democracy.