Two Pieces of Mine on Sudan

An Islamic point of view, and a more technical consideration of terrorism designations.

I’ve had two pieces come out on Sudan recently, looking at the war there from very different angles.

One is an article in Yaqeen Institute’s journal Hashiya, titled “The War in Sudan and Its Implications for the Umma.” The piece is written overtly from my point of view as a Muslim. So it has a different tone than my writings here at the newsletter, but deals with some topics that may interest Muslim and non-Muslim readers alike. Specifically, I was trying to think through my own (a) pronounced sympathies for/affinities with revolutionary points of view, (b) desire to see a form of Islamic politics that does not resemble the heavy-handed approach of the “Inqaz” or “Salvation” regime, and (c) struggle in thinking about what battlefield developments might mean for future political configurations in Sudan. On the one hand, a victory for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) could bring a great deal of stability to the country, pushing the odious Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to the peripheries or even into oblivion. On the other hand, an SAF victory would likely entrench authoritarianism (I do not believe that they would be a caretaker, transitional force) and smother chances for accountability, as already seen in the SAF’s approach to RSF defectors.

In connection with the question of stabilization under SAF rule, I would also recommend readers see this important report from AFP about how life in the capital Khartoum, formally under SAF rule, involves the presence of a coalition of armed groups under the SAF’s umbrella.

“They’re all mercenaries looking out for their own interests,” said a diplomat in Sudan.

“If they ever feel short-changed, they’re out,” he added, calling the Joint Forces “the next Hemeti”.

Pre-war Khartoum via Wikimedia Commons

The other piece of mine, which came out at Responsible Statecraft, examines a narrower and more technical - but still important - set of issues: should the United States government designate the RSF as a terrorist group? I made a light foray into a kind of journalism for this piece, interviewing the Sudanese journalist Eiad Husham, the Sudan expert Alex de Waal, and the former U.S. government official Jason Blazakis. I learned a lot about the workings and limitations of terrorism designations in the process. Here’s one excerpt:

Husham told me that “targeted financial and personal sanctions have only a limited impact on the RSF leadership…many of them emerged from a regime that operated under international sanctions for nearly three decades, so they have experience adapting to those restrictions.” Husham added that “sanctions alone do not necessarily isolate individuals politically or diplomatically,” as evidenced by the visit of Hemedti’s brother Algoni to Washington in October 2025, despite being under sanctions himself.

A terrorism designation for the RSF would not necessarily hinder the group. Jason Blazakis, a former State Department official who authored the recently published “Terror Disrupted: Countering the Financing of Terrorism,” told me that enforcing terrorism designations overseas is difficult; the most effective applications involve “international cohesion” and broad coordination with other governments and the United Nations, something the Trump administration seldom seeks. Even with a coalition, enforcement would still be difficult: for example, Blazakis said, it is “very unlikely that RSF gold profits moving through the UAE would be flagged.”

I welcome readers’ comments on either piece.