Dakar to Riyadh: Links for 7/12/2024
News and analysis from the Sahel, North Africa, the Horn, and the Middle East.
Last week’s links are here.
Sahel and West Africa
Sahidi Bilan and Rob Lemkin on a largely forgotten chapter of Nigerien history:
When Niger’s military government last year expelled the troops and diplomats of the former colonising power France, some Nigeriens saw it as the resumption of a process rudely interrupted in September 1958. Sixty-six years ago, on the eve of independence, Niger’s first African government council was led by the Sawaba party (Sawaba means ‘liberation’ and ‘well-being’ in Niger’s main language Hausa) and its Prime Minister was a charismatic decolonial trade unionist called Djibo Bakary.
Sawaba’s overthrow in 1958 by France was Africa’s first modern coup d’etat. In no time the party was proscribed and driven underground; it went on to create a resistance movement with the support of African anti-imperialist states like Ghana and Algeria and developed a significant guerrilla training programme with help from the socialist bloc notably the People’s Republic of China.
Bram Posthumus has a fascinating series of blog posts called “Thinking About the Sahel.” It starts here.
This article develops the notion of ‘earnest struggles’ in Senegal’s postcolonial history and shows that successive governments have indeed tried to move their country forward against the odds. The focus is on three struggles: First, the attempts at transforming the Senegalese economy away from colonial cash crops and the influence of the French from 1960 to 1980. Second, the struggle of grappling with Global South debt crisis and the devaluation of the Franc CFA by 50% between 1980 to 2004. Third, the struggle to expand the Senegalese economy with newfound fiscal space and novel forms of external debt since international debt relief in 2004 until today. Based on financial data and interviews in Dakar and Paris, I argue that these struggles have led to some structural transformation. However, the danger of debt crisis has not gone, and economic self-determination has remained precarious. Dependence on foreign finance has stayed and reached record levels in recent years. Relative delinking and the search for regional complementarities offers a more promising avenue to break out of the structural condition of international financial subordination.
A good article from ZAM Magazine on why many Sahelians dislike France and have welcomed Russia - and why military rule plus Russian involvement is another likely dead end for the region.
A new study (Fr) on experiences of internal displacement in Burkina Faso.
A new report on banditry in Nigeria.
Reuters: “Nigeria to Suspend Taxes on Certain Food Imports to Curb Rising Prices.”
Le Monde (Fr) on American plans - with the government’s permission - to build a base in Odienné, northwest Cote d’Ivoire. What could go wrong?
North Africa
Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune said on Thursday he will run for second presidential term in election expected on Sept. 7.
Tebboune, 78, is widely expected to win a second and final term of five years after he secured the support of the main political parties as well as organizations from civil society.
AFP on the devastating impacts of drought in Tunisia - and how there is likely more water scarcity on the horizon.
Geoff Porter on poverty, politics, and pipelines in North Africa:
The region through which the TransMed pipeline first passes in Tunisia suffers from the country’s highest poverty rates. In Majel Bel Abbes, a town with no stop signs and just a couple of speed bumps to slow drivers down as they blast through on their way to someplace else, the poverty rate is 41.4%. In Sbeitla, home to the Roman ruins, the military base and a compression station, the poverty rate is 1 in 3. In Sbikha, where another compression station is located, the rate is similar.
The official unemployment rate across southwestern Tunisia is 22.3%, though that is likely an undercount. Youth unemployment rates are higher still, particularly among young men. Almost half the region’s population is employed in agriculture, which is seasonal, meaning that even if residents are recorded as employed, for much of the year they are idle. Young men are poor, unemployed or underemployed, and bored, staring at their phones as they sit in cafes taking the smallest sips of their coffees to make them last longer.
Wolfram Lacher: “Invisible Occupation: Turkey and Russia in Libya.”
Morocco plans to acquire a spy satellite from Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI) in a $1 billion deal, Moroccan media reported on Wednesday.
[…]
Israel and Morocco agreed a defence pact in 2021, covering intelligence and cooperation in military industries and procurement.
Greater Horn of Africa
Kenyan President William Ruto, still reeling from protests against the (now withdrawn) finance bill, fires his cabinet.
Bloomberg: “Somali Piracy Revives Sharply After Years of Quiet.”
Kalkidan Yibeltal on kidnapping in Ethiopia’s Oromia region.
Interesting phrasing in this readout of the U.S. Ambassador’s visit to Hargeisa.
Mashriq
Two noteworthy pieces on Jordan’s complex domestic and regional situation. (1) by Jason Burke. Here’s the subhead: “As protests rage and tourism dwindles, kingdom must juggle its close ties to US with demands for end to conflict.” (Note: I don’t like the choice of the word “rage” here - this plays in too easily to the trope of “Muslim rage.”) And (2) by Curtis Ryan, who writes, “In Jordanian streets…the Gaza war has revived Jordan’s diverse opposition movements, bringing protesters out in large numbers, at times clashing with authorities but at others aligning with the demands of the state itself for an end to the conflict.”
Eskander Sadeghi-Boroujerdi on Iran’s elections and why Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears to have tolerated or even stage-managed the reformist candidate’s victory:
In 2021, the presidential contest was inseparable from the question of leadership succession. Now these two processes of elite selection have been decoupled. In light of this, Khamenei’s inner circle have seemed willing to entertain the idea of reintegrating the more politically amenable section of the reformists – often called ‘state reformists’ by their critics – as a means of stabilizing the system. Unlike the presidential race of 1997, when the establishment was taken by surprise by the success of the so-called ‘left flank’ of the political class, this time they were prepared for a moderate candidate, even if he wasn’t their first choice. Khamenei and his closest allies may also have realized that when hardline Principalists (Osulgarayan) control every branch of the state, the supreme leader himself becomes a lightning rod for pent-up anger at the system, making it harder to deflect blame for corruption and mismanagement.
Some thoughts from me on Western media coverage of Iran here.
Rana Mamdouh and Sultan Alamer: “Why Pilgrims Are Dying on the Hajj.”
The first wife of the late leader of the jihadist group Islamic State (IS), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has been sentenced to death by a court in Iraq, the country’s judiciary says.
Karkh Criminal Court convicted the woman of “working with the extremist organisation and detaining Yazidi women”, according to the Supreme Judicial Council.
An interior ministry official identified her as Asma Mohammed, also known as Umm Hudaifa.
Armin Messager (Fr) on Salafi-jihadist recruitment in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan Province.