Syria's Abu Muhammad al-Julani - Some Background and Resources
The leader of the current offensive in Syria is dynamic and pragmatic, but has a bloody past.
With the lightning advance of Syrian rebels out of Idlib and into Aleppo and beyond, Abu Muhammad al-Julani has confirmed his status as a pivotal figure in the twenty-first-century Middle East. Al-Julani currently heads Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (the Group for Liberating Syria, HTS). He was a key actor in the series of events leading to the break between al-Qaida and the Islamic State in 2013-2014; he has been one of the most tenacious rebel leaders in post-2011 Syria; he has been a major innovator in what it means to be a “jihadist”; and he is now one primary author in a military campaign that has shocked the world.
Who Is al-Julani?
Although one sees al-Julani’s name everywhere in the media now, one rarely sees in-depth treatments of him. Basic facts of al-Julani’s early biography remain disputed, as this BBC Arabic profile carefully shows. One would think that al-Julani’s own autobiographical comments, as given to PBS’ Martin Smith in a 2021 interview, would settle the matter, but the information available remains sparse and somewhat uncertain, especially about al-Julani’s life prior to 2011.
There seems to be broad acceptance, among Syria specialists, of the idea that al-Julani’s family (as his pseudonym indicates) was displaced from the Golan Heights. Al-Julani’s own comments indicate that he was born in 1982 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and various researchers find this plausible, although other sources (for example, the U.S. government and Interpol) give an earlier range of birth dates and place his birth inside Syria. One detailed account by two Syrian researchers indicates that al-Julani’s father was an economist specializing in issues of oil and development. He worked in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s before taking up high positions in the Syrian government but then “ended up a victim of administrative injustice after refusing to sign off on illegal economic transactions requested by senior regime officials.” This history matters to the extent that much symbolism is at stake today as al-Julani shapes and reshapes his own image, especially in a post 10/7 world.
Al-Julani’s life comes into better focus in the 2000s and especially the 2010s. Inspired by the 2000 Palestinian Intifada, the 9/11 attacks, and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, al-Julani joined the militant Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi (1966-2006) to fight U.S. forces (and the Shi‘a). Al-Julani became one of al-Zarqawi’s successors in what came to be called “the Islamic State of Iraq,” then under the banner of al-Qaida. In 2011, al-Julani was tapped by ISI leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to lead an expeditionary force to participate in the Syrian revolution. The events that followed have been extensively discussed by analysts - al-Julani, al-Baghdadi, and al-Qaida’s then-leader Ayman al-Zawahiri (1951-2022) clashed extensively over questions of leadership, with al-Julani electing to remain under the command of al-Qaida and al-Zawahiri while al-Baghdadi and his group (let’s just call it Islamic State, for the sake of simplicity) became their own rival organization. Al-Julani’s own group was called Jabhat al-Nusra (Support Front).
A second key episode during the 2010s was Nusra’s break with al-Qaida in 2016. Those events have also been intensively discussed. At the time, some analysts argued that the break was disingenuous, but with the passage of years my impression is that the evidence and the majority opinion among analysts now point towards the break having been meaningful and substantial. Nusra initially renamed itself Jabhat Fath al-Sham (Syria Conquest Front) and then, in 2017, Nusra became the senior party in a new coalition, HTS. Territorially, HTS’ center of gravity is Idlib, northwest Syria. Idlib saw significant rebel-government fighting between 2011 and 2015, as well as significant intra-rebel fighting in 2016-2017, with HTS and allies emerging victorious. Idlib has been under the formal control of the HTS-backed “Salvation Government” since 2017.
Resources for Understanding al-Julani and HTS
Here are a few key resources for understanding al-Julani and HTS:
Al-Julani’s first-ever mass media interview with Al Jazeera (2013).
An interview conducted by International Crisis Group analysts with al-Julani (2020).
The previously mentioned PBS Frontline episode (2021).
A report from Idlib by France24’s Wassim Nasr (2023).
Orwa Ajjoub’s analysis of HTS’ internal divisions at Middle East Institute (2024).
Jerome Drevon’s book From Jihad to Politics (2024) - and see also my interview with Drevon here.
Looking back through the interviews, one quotation from al-Julani (from the 2020 Crisis Group piece) stands out to me now:
If you ask me to be realistic and to accept that there is no international will to effect regime change, the world should also be realistic and accept that over half of Syria’s population, some twelve million people, chose not to live under regime control. They voted with their feet. The least these people deserve is to live in safety. When you walk around here in Idlib, pick any civilian and ask them what it means to them to live under regime control. They will tell you that they prefer living in makeshift camps where their kids are dying in harsh weather conditions over returning to regime areas where they know they will be tortured and killed.
It seems to me that this reading of Syria’s human geography is part of the political calculation underpinning the current rebel advance.
How Is al-Julani Perceived?
Perception management has clearly been a major topic on al-Julani’s mind since at least 2016 - which helps explain why he has been so open to talking with Western researchers and journalists and giving them (highly curated) access to Idlib. Al-Julani has sought to convince Western governments, through his approach to governance and conflict and through his interviews, that he is not a threat to them.
Responding to a question from PBS in 2021 about his designation as a “terrorist” by Western governments, al-Julani said, “It’s a political label that carries no truth or credibility. We haven't posed any threat to Western or European society. No security threat, no economic threat, nothing.” Al-Julani has also been seeking, over the past few years and in the present, to portray himself as someone who respects classical Islamic norms of warfare in a way that breaks with other jihadists’ penchant for killing civilians and plunging into sectarian violence. Reports on the ground suggest HTS fighters do show considerable restraint, but it’s also worth noting that in interviews, al-Julani seems to project his current attitudes backwards in time, even to his days with al-Zarqawi, in a manner that is not entirely convincing to me. I can believe that he has changed, softened, and become more pragmatic; it would be harder to believe that he had exactly the same attitudes twenty years ago. In any event, al-Julani has been successful to the extent that various Western diplomats and analysts see him as credible and as a kind of “least bad option,” and the Biden administration, while still calling HTS a “terrorist organization,” is nevertheless publicly neutral on the current power struggle.
Amid the current offensive, I’m seeing four or five main perspectives in Western media and social media regarding al-Julani and HTS:
Certain think tankers and anti-Bashar al-Assad voices cheering on what they see as a rebel advance.
Certain Sunni Muslims cheering on what they see as a victory for Muslims and Islam against a non-Muslim tyrant.
Certain leftists - whether pro-Assad or neutral - who see al-Julani and HTS as Turkish and/or NATO stooges.
Governments skeptical of or hostile to HTS, viewing them as jihadists and terrorists.
Those who believe all of the factions/players are problematic.
I put myself mostly in the fifth camp. I believe that Assad is a vicious tyrant who deserves to fall, and I believe al-Julani is a dynamic and three-dimensional figure, and I also recognize something of the complexity of the Syrian landscape and the utter lack of storybook heroes there. At the same time, I cannot root for al-Julani given the many crimes in his background and some serious remaining concerns about his intentions and aims. As a Sunni Muslim myself, I find myself moved by the supplication Imam Omar Suleiman posted: “Lord, destroy the oppressors by means of the oppressors and bring us forth safely from among them.” That would be my own prayer for the people of Syria.
In closing, for updates and analyses on the rapidly moving situation in Syria, I can recommend pieces by the Financial Times, Ishaan Tharoor, Derek Davison, Robin Yassin-Kassab, and Haid Haid. Al Jazeera also has a useful map showing the shifting geography of control.